Abstract-Mapping messages or a user's identity into a point on elliptic curves is required by many pairing-based cryptographic schemes. In most of pairing-based schemes, this requirement is realized by a special hash function, MapToPoint function. However, the efficiency of the MapToPoint function is much lower than the general hash functions. In this paper, we propose a new identity-based signature (IBS) scheme without MapToPoint function which speeds up extracting secret key and verifying the signatures. The security of the proposed scheme depends on a complex assumption similar to k-CAA. Furthermore, the proposed scheme also supports batch verifications such that multiple signatures on distinct messages for distinct users are verified simultaneously. The results show that batch verifications on the proposed IBS scheme is much faster than other IBS schemes.
I. INTRODUCTION
The idea of identity-based public key cryptography (ID-PKC) [1] has been proposed for almost twenty years. Although ID-PKC has ability to simplify the key management in comparison of the traditional public key cryptography (PKC) [2] , they were rarely discussed in the real applications for lack of efficient algorithms.
Recently, Boneh and Franklin [3] constructed an efficient identity-based encryption (IBE) scheme by bilinear pairings. Since then, the research on ID-PKC has made great progress and lots of schemes were published, such as identity-based encryption (IBE) schemes [4] , [5] , identity-based key agreement schemes [6] , [7] , identity-based signature (IBS) scheme [8] , [9] , [10] , [11] , [12] , [13] , [14] . In particular, IBS has been discussed in the application of securing IPv6 neighbor and router discovery [15] . However, improving the efficiency of IBS scheme is still a interesting research topic.
The first contribution of this paper is to introduce a faster IBS scheme than the existing IBS schemes [8] , [9] , [12] , [13] , [11] , [14] . In the IBS scheme above, a special hash function called MapToPoint function [16] which is used to map an identity information (e.g. user name, IP address) into a point on elliptic curve is necessary. This special function is probabilistic and time consuming. Most recently, Zhang et al. [17] modified the BLS signature [16] to obtain a fast short signature scheme (ZSS scheme) without MapToPoint function. Motivated by their method, we propose a new IBS scheme without MapToPoint function in the random oracle model, which offers better performance than other IBS schemes from pairings. To prove the security of the new IBS scheme, a new complex assumption similar to k-CAA is given. Furthermore, a method, called batch verifications [18] , [14] , is discussed for IBS such that multiple signatures are verified simultaneously and the time for the verifications of IBS scheme is reduced. Batch verification is classified into three type: Type 1, Type 2 and Type 3. Unfortunately, only an IBS scheme [14] has ability to support batch verification of Type 3 until now. The second contribution of this paper is that the new scheme supports the batch verification of Type 3. We will show how batch verification on the new scheme is implemented and provides better performance than other IBS scheme.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: Section II introduces some basic knowledge of bilinear pairings and the security notion for IBS scheme. Section III first presents a new complex assumption and a new IBS scheme, then gives the detailed security analysis of this scheme. Section IV describes how to speed up verifications when receiving many signatures generated by the proposed scheme. The comparison of the performance with other IBS schemes is shown in Section V. Finally, the conclusion is drawn in Section VI.
II. PRELIMINARIES
Before describing the new IBS scheme, we first introduce some preliminary knowledge in this section.
A. Bilinear Pairing and k-CAA
Suppose that G 1 and G 2 are an additive group and a multiplicative group, respectively. They are two cyclic groups of the prime order l. Let P and Q be two distinct generators of G 1 . The discrete logarithm problem (DLP) is hard in both G 1 and G 2 . Our scheme requires a bilinear pairing, e : G 1 × G 1 → G 2 , which has the following properties: 1) Bilinear:ê(aP, bQ) =ê(P, Q) ab for all P, Q ∈ G 1 and a, b ∈ Z * l .
2) Non-degenerate: there isê(P, P ) = 1 for P = O. 3) Computable: there exists an efficient algorithm to computeê(P, Q) for all P, Q ∈ G 1 . As shown in [19] , the modified Tate pairing on a supersingular elliptic curve is such a bilinear pairing.
ZSS scheme [17] depends on a complex assumption: there is no polynomial time algorithm for the Collusion of Attack Algorithm with k Traitors (k-CAA) [20] . The definition of k-CAA is as following:
at most time t with the possibility at least ǫ. We say that this (t, ǫ)-algorithm can solve k-CAA. Until now, no polynomial time algorithm solves k-CAA.
B. The Security of IBS scheme
IBS scheme includes four algorithms: Setup, Extract, Sign and Verify. They are used to generate the sysytem parameters, extract the secret key associated the user's identity, sign the message by the secret key and verify the signatures under the public key and the user's identity. In the random oracle model, we say an IBS scheme is existential unforgeability under an adaptive chosen message and identity attack [12] if no polynomial time algorithm F has non-negligible probability against a challenger C in the following game:
• Setup: The challenger C runs Setup to generate the public key and the master key. The public key is sent to the adversary F .
• Query: F makes the following queries: 1) Extract query: Given user's identities id i , C outputs the corresponding private keys by running Extract. 2) Message hash query: C computes the hash value of the message m j and sends them to F . 3) Sign query: Given (id i , m j ), C outputs signature σ by running Sign and sends them to F .
• Output: F outputs (id, m, σ) and wins the game if 1) (id, m, σ) is a valid signature; 2) id is not any of id i and (id, m) is not any of (id i , m j ). Otherwise, F stops and outputs failure. Let ǫ denote the probability that F wins this above game, we have the following definition:
Definition 2: In the random oracle model, an algorithm F can (t, q H , q E , q S , ǫ)-breaks an IBS scheme if F outputs a forgery with probability at least ǫ by running in time at most t, making at most q H queries to the hash oracle, q E extract queries, q S signature queries. An IBS signature scheme is (t, q H , q E , q S , ǫ)-existential unforgeable under an adaptive chosen message and identity attack if no algorithm (t, q H , q E , q S , ǫ)-breaks it.
C. Batch Verifications and Its Security
The goal of batch verifications is to verifying the multiple signatures simultaneously such that the time for verifications is reduced. Its definition is:
Definition 3: Given multiple signatures σ 1 , σ 2 , · · · , σ n on the messages m 1 , m 2 , · · · , m n and corresponding identities id 1 , id 2 , · · · , id n , a verifier check the validity of some of or all the signatures at once. There are three types of batch verifications [14] [14] formalized the notion of the attack model of batch verifications of Type 1, 2 and 3 on the general IBS scheme. We say that F is a λ-batch forger of Type 1, 2 and 3 if it wins the following game:
• Setup: F is given public parameters.
• Queries: F accesses the hash, extract and sign oracle by his choices and obtains the hash values of his queries, the secret keys of his chosen identities and the signatures of his chosen identities and messages.
• Outputs: Finally, F outputs an integer n whose value is not larger than λ, id 1 , id 2 , · · · , id n and messages m 1 , m 2 , · · · , m n and corresponding signatures σ 1 , σ 2 , · · · , σ n of Type 1, 2 and 3. Note that id n must not be queried by the extract oracle, m n must not be queried by the sign oracle. F wins the game if F 's outputs pass the batch verifications successfully. In this game, note that F is given the power to access all the users' private keys except id n and access the sign oracle on all the messages except m n . The detailed definition of a λ-batch forger is as follows:
Definition 4: In the random oracle model, a λ-batch forger F (t, q H , q E , q S , λ, ǫ)-breaks the batch verifications on some IBS scheme by the adaptive chosen message and identity attack if F runs in time at most t, makes at most q H queries to the hash oracle, q E extract queries and q S signature queries with the probability at least ǫ to generate at most λ signatures which pass successfully the batch verifications.
III. THE PROPOSED IDENTITY-BASED SIGNATURE SCHEME
In this section, a new complexity assumption is first introduced. We then describe the new IBS scheme and its security analysis.
A. Generalized k-CAA
Before introducing the new IBS scheme, we first propose a new complex assumption, here called Generalized k-CAA:
Definition 5: For a known k ∈ Z and an unknown x ∈ Z * l , k is the product of two integers m and n, Generalized k-CAA is an algorithm which computes
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at most time t with the possibility at least ǫ. We say that this (t, ǫ)-algorithm can solve the Generalized k-CAA. Let f i = 1, the Generalized k-CAA is transformed into n-CAA. Thus, k-CAA can be seen as a special case of the Generalized k-CAA. From the description above, the following lemma is obtained:
Lemma 1: There is no polynomial time algorithm for solving the Generalized k-CAA.
Proof: Suppose that there is a polynomial time algorithm can solve the Generalized k-CAA. From the description above, this algorithm must solve n-CAA. We know that there is no polynomial time algorithm for solving n-CAA, therefore, the supposal is not correct.
B. The Proposed IBS Scheme
In the existing IBS schemes from bilinear pairings [9] , [11] , [12] , [13] , [14] , extracting the secret key from the master key and the user's identity always requires a special hash function called MapToPoint function [16] which maps the user's identity id (where id ∈ Z * l ) into an element of G 1 . Recently, in Mitsunari's traitor tracing scheme for tracing malicious authorized users [20] and Zhang's ID-based Chameleon hash function [21] , another method for generating the secret key S id from the master key x ∈ Z * l and the user's identity id:
where H is a general hash function). By this method of generating the secret key, a new IBS scheme without MapToPoint function is constructed. The scheme is described as follows:
• Setup: the trust authority (TA) chooses randomly P ∈ G 1 and x ∈ Z * l , compute P pub = xP and precompute ω =ê(P, P ). x is the master key. The public key is (P, P pub , ω, H), where H :
l is a hash function.
• Extract: For a given identity id ∈ Z * l , TA computes the secret key S id = 1 x+id P . Note if x + id ≡ 0 (mod l), then abort x and return Setup to choose another x.
• Sign: Given the secret key S id and the message m ∈ {0, 1} * , the signer chooses a random element s from Z * l and computes r = ω s , u = H(m, r), v = (u + s)S id . The signature pair (r, v) is sent to the verifier.
• Verify: Given public key (P, P pub , ω, H), a message m and a signature pair (r, v), the verifier computes u = H(m, r), and accepts the signature if ω u r =ê(P pub + id·P, v).
Note that Extract is only done once for every identity. The procedure of the verification is deduced as follows:
C. Security Analysis
To prove that the security of the proposed scheme depends on the Generalized k-CAA, the following theorem is given:
Theorem 1: In the random oracle model, if an algorithm F (t, q H , q E , q S , ǫ)-breaks the proposed scheme under the adaptive chosen message and identity attack, then there is another (t ′ , ǫ ′ ) -algorithm C which can solve the Generalized k-CAA, where
Proof: Suppose that an algorithm F (t, q H , q E , q S , ǫ)-breaks the proposed scheme by the adaptive chosen message and identity attacks. We expect to construct an algorithm C to solve the Generalized k-CAA from F . Namely, given a tuple (
In the following simulation, Q = xP , and F and C play the role of the adversary and the challenger, respectively. F will interact with C as follows:
• Setup: C runs Setup to obtain the public key (P , Q,ω, H) and the master key x. The public key are sent to F .
• Query: F issues the following queries for the identities
When F sends a query for the message m j , C picks two random elements s j and u j from Z * l (it is noted that s i + u i = s j + u j when i = j), then computes r j = ω sj and let u j = H(m j , r j ). u j is sent to F as the response of the hash query on the message
3) Sign Query: For any given identity-message pair (id i , m j ), C first runs the hash query algorithm to check whether m j appears in L 1 -list. If not, C stops the simulation and report failure. Otherwise, C obtains the corresponding r j , u j and s j from L 1 and computes
C finds h k from L 2 such that h k = u j + s j , then the pair (r j , uj +sj x+idi P ) is viewed as the signature on the message m j for the user id i from C's point of view. C returns it to F as the response of the sign oracle.
• Output: Finally, F outputs a pair (r * , v * ) on the message m * for the user id * , and accepts it if the following conditions are satisfied: 
x+id * P is viewed as the solution of the Generalized k-CAA. The reason is as follows: when m = q S and n = q E , namely k = q E · q S , C can compute v * from the known tuple {h 1 ,
P } where h i is from the response of the message hash query on the message m i , the pair (m i , id j ) is random by F 's adaptive choices.
Since the hash function behaves as a random oracle, F is not sure whether C is a simulator or a real attacker. The running time t ′ of C is the same as t of F . In the step of Sign Query, C stops the simulation and report failure only when m j is not in the L 1 . The probability that this event doesn't happen is qS qH . For all the q S sign queries, C's success probability is ( qS qH ) qE ·qS . Furthermore, the probability of another independent event, h
IV. BATCH VERIFICATION
Recently, Yoon et al. [14] used a method called batch verifications to speed up the verification on IBS scheme from the bilinear pairings. In fact, it is more exact to call this method signature screening [18] . The reason has described in [18] : this method is not used to determine whether every signature for verification is the correct one of the corresponding message but determine whether the signer has at some point authenticated the messages for verifications. Signature screening is a very useful tool in the real applications. Some examples are given in [14] .
Until now, batch verification of Type 2 has been support by most IBS schemes, but only the IBS scheme in [14] supports batch verification of Type 3. Fortunately, the proposed IBS scheme supports both Type 2 and Type 3. The following shows how batch verifications of Type 2 and 3 on the proposed scheme are implemented.
• Batch Verification for Type 2: Suppose a signer with the identity id generates the signatures
Then the verifier can verify these signatures simultaneously by the following:
where all the messages are distinct, so are the identities. Then the verifier can verify these signatures simultaneously by the following:
id i ·v i ) From the description above, it is obvious that Type 2 is a special case of Type 3. In the next section, we concentrate on proving the security of batch verification of Type 3 on the proposed scheme.
A. The Security of Batch Verifications for Type 3
The security of batch verifications of Type 3 on the proposed IBS scheme depends on the following theorem:
Theorem 2: In the random oracle model, if a λ-batch forger F (t, q H , q E , q S , λ, ǫ)-breaks the batch verifications of Type 3 on the proposed scheme under the adaptive chosen message and identity attack, then there is another (t ′ , ǫ ′ )-algorithm C which has ability of solving the Generalized k-CAA, where
Suppose the algorithm F is a λ-batch forger that (t, q H , q E , q S , λ, ǫ)-breaks the proposed IBS scheme. We wish to construct another algorithm C to solve the Generalized k-CAA. In the following game, C plays the role of challenger and interacts with the forger F :
• Setup: Algorithm C runs Setup and sends F the public key (P , Q, ω, H), where Q = xP and x is a random element in Z * l .
• Queries: F makes the following queries 1) Key Extract Query: Algorithm F queries the extract oracle by his chosen identities id i , where 1 ≤ i ≤ q E . C responds the corresponding private keys
for responding F 's queries on the message hash query. When the adversary F queries the hash oracle on the message m i , the H-list is changed as follows: If F sends a query for message m i which has appeared in H-list, then C answers the corresponding (r i , u i , s i ) to F . Otherwise, C picks a random element s i ∈ Z * l and a random element u i ∈ Z * l , then computes r i = w si .
3) Sign Query: For any given identity-message pair (id i , m j ), C responds F 's queries on the sign oracle as follows: C scans the H-list to check whether m j is in the list or not. If it is not, F stops the simulation and reports failure. Otherwise, F obtains the corresponding r j , u j , s j . Since F is λ-batch forger of Type 3 that requires multiple signatures on multiple messages generated by multiple signers, a distinct message must be signed by a distinct user.
There is a one-to-one map relationship between the user set U : {id 1 , id 2 , · · · , id qE } and the message set M : {m 1 , m 2 , · · · , m qS }. We might as well think that the signature on the message m i for the user id j is discarded if i = j. Suppose C computes δ j = u j +s j such that δ j ∈ {h 1 , h 2 , · · · , h qH } (q S ≤ q H ), then computes the signature v j = δ j S idj . Otherwise, C stops the simulation and report failure. Finally, r j and v j are sent to F as the response of the sign query.
• Output: Eventually, F stops the simulation and returns the following values: a value n, n identities id 1 , id 2 , · · · , id n , n messages m 1 , m 2 , · · · , m n and n signatures (r 1 , v 1 ), (r 2 , v 2 ), · · · , (r n , v n ). Notes that id n and m n must not be queried by the extract oracle and the sign oracle, respectively. The corresponding H-list is < m i , r i , u i , s i > where 1 ≤ i ≤ (n − 1). F wins the game only if the following conditions are satisfied: 1) F 's outputs pass the batch verifications, 2) There is a one-to-one map between the user set U and the message set M . The distinct message must be signed for the distinct user. Suppose r n = ω sn , let u n = H(m n , r n ), where s n and u n are randomly chosen in Z * l such that
) must pass the batch verifications. Therefore, the following formula is correct:
Since ω =ê(P, P ) and r i = w si , combine (1) with (2):
Hence, v n = un+sn x+idn P = δn s+idn P . Since δ n / ∈ {h 1 , h 2 , · · · ,h qH } and id n is not queried by the extract oracle, C outputs v n as the solution of the Generalized k-CAA (Actually, v n is the solution of a special instance of the Generalized k-CAA: given a tuple (
f x+g P . C aborts the simulation only when δ i / ∈ {h 1 , h 2 , · · · , h qH }. The probability that F 's outputs pass batch verifications is at least q S /q H . Thus, for all sign queries, the probability that C's outputs pass batch verifications is at least (q S /q H ) qS . The probability of another event, δ n / ∈ {h 1 , h 2 , · · · ,h qH }, is 1− qS l . The probability that C successfully outputs the solution of k-CAA is (l−qS )(qS ) q S l(qH ) q S · ǫ. C's running time is identical to F 's running time, t = t ′ .
V. PERFORMANCE COMPARISON
In this section, we first compare our proposed IBS scheme with other IBS schemes [8] , [9] , [11] , [12] , [13] , [14] in respect to efficiency. We then show how batch verification of Type 3 on our scheme offers better performance than other IBS scheme.
Because the proposed IBS scheme requires a bilinear pairing with the propertyê(P, P ) = 1, and consider that the cost of the exponentiation on G 2 is very time comsuming when the embedding degree is large. Thus, we choose a subgroup of order l in a supersingular elliptic curve E(F p ) with the embedding degree 2, where l is a 160-bit prime and p is 512-bit prime. Timings for some cryptographic primitives over F p , G 1 and G 2 are shown in Table I where I, M G1 , H M , P , E, A and M G2 denote the cost of computing an inverse operation over F p , a scalar multiplication in G 1 , the MapToPoint function, the pairing, an exponentiation in G 2 , a point addition on G 1 and a multiplication on G 2 , respectively. All the implementation of these primitives are provided by Miracl [22] on Pentium IV 2.26GHz with 256M RAM. The results in Table I indicate that the cost of I, A and M G2 are trivial in comparison with other primitives. Thus, they are usually omitted in the following analysis except mentioning them.
Ref. [11] has showed that Hess' scheme provided advantage over the other scheme [8] , [9] , [12] in term of the efficiency. Thus, only Hess' scheme in comparison with other IBS schemes is considered in the following. Besides [8] , [9] , [11] , [12] , Yi [13] also proposed an IBS scheme with the shortest signature. Another IBS scheme is introduced by Yoon-CheonKim (YCK) [14] in order to support batch verifications of Type 3. Table II lists the main primitives required by the proposed signature scheme, Hess' scheme, Yi's scheme and YCK scheme. Refer to Table I and Table II , it is obvious that the proposed scheme requires a shortest running time for extracting secret key in all the four schemes. In the step of sign, both the proposed scheme and Hess' scheme require 1M G1 + 1E which is faster than 3M G1 in Yi's scheme and 1H M + 3M G1 in YCK scheme. In the step of verify, the proposed scheme requires 1M G1 + 1P + 1E which is more efficient than 1H M + 1E + 2P in Hess's scheme, 1H M + 1M G1 + 2P in Yi's scheme and YCK scheme. From the timings for the cryptographic primitives in Table I , the verification of the proposed scheme makes an improvement of approximately 43% on Hess's scheme, 45% on Yi's scheme and YCK scheme. We notice that Hess's scheme can reduce by one pairing computation in the verify step when the same identities occur frequently [11] , but two pairing computation is still necessary in the first verification. Therefore it is believable that the proposed scheme provides fastest verification in all the IBS scheme. Although Yi's scheme doesn't require pre- 
Signature size
computation and provides the shortest signature, its signature scheme has to depend on a fixed elliptic curve [13] . However, The proposed scheme and Hess' scheme are not limited by this condition. In addition, by the technology of the point compression, the proposed scheme and Hess' scheme also provide the signature with the same size as Yi's scheme. To verify the signatures on n distinct messages for n distinct signers, the batch verifications for Type 3 of [14] require to compute n + 1 pairings, n scalar multiplications and n MapToPoint. However, using the batch verifications on the proposed scheme, only two pairings, one exponentiation on G 2 , n−1 multiplications on G 2 , n scalar multiplications on G 1 are required. From Table I , batch verification on YCK scheme requires about (57n + 47)ms, but the batch verification on the proposed scheme takes about (7n+98)ms. When n is a large number (e.g. n ≥ 100), batch verification on the proposed scheme significantly reduces verification time. Finally, the recent research showed that the exponentiation operation on G 2 is time consuming when p and the embedding degree are large [23] . Thus, our proposed IBS scheme may not be more efficient than other schemes which do not require exponentiation operation.
VI. CONCLUSION
In this paper, an efficient IBS scheme is introduced. Its security depends on a variant of k-CAA. This new IBS scheme improves the efficiency of extracting secret key and verifying signature by eliminating the special hash function, MapToPoint function. The results of the implementations indicate that the proposed scheme is the most efficient in all IBS schemes from pairings. In particular, the efficiency of the verification is improved by at least 40% in some case. Furthermore, this new IBS scheme supports batch verifications which speeds up the verifications of multiple signatures. The results show batch verifications on our scheme provide better performance than other IBS scheme. However, how to construct an IBS scheme without random oracles is still an open problem.
